WORKERS\u27 COMPENSATION/ATTORNEY\u27S FEE AWARDS--FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEY\u27S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS\u27 COMPENSATION ACT by Michaud, Danielle S.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 31 31 (2009)





FEE AWARDS--FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?:
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE
LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
Danielle S. Michaud
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Danielle S. Michaud, WORKERS' COMPENSATION/ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS--FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?: STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 833 (2009), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss3/14
WORKERS' COMPENSATION / ATTORNEY'S FEE 
AWARDS FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?: STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE 
LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Bordeaux never finished the ninth grade.1 After drop­
ping out of school, he worked as a pipefitter's apprentice and con­
tinued to work hard manual labor for the next forty years.2 In 1997, 
Bordeaux, then in his mid-fifties, accepted a position with Pitts­
burgh & Conneaut Dock Company where he worked as a structural 
welder and pipefitter.3 These positions required heavy lifting, 
manipulating powerful and heavy machinery, and climbing with 
tools weighing nearly fifty pounds apiece.4 Clearly, Bordeaux's 
body was his livelihood. 
On September 12, 2000, Bordeaux climbed into a deep, narrow 
pit to clear coal mud from an intake pipe.5 While Bordeaux was 
bent over, a coworker on the surface lost control of a wet fifty­
pound sandbag that fell into the pit, hitting Bordeaux at the base of 
his head and neck.6 Despite receiving emergency treatment imme­
diately after the accident and extensive physical and cognitive ther­
apies in the years that followed, Bordeaux continued to experience 
pain, dizziness, speech problems, and cognitive difficulties that pre­
cluded him from returning to work at his previous position, or even 
a suitable alternative.7 
Although Bordeaux's employer voluntarily began paying some 
disability benefits, a dispute later arose as to the precise nature of 
Bordeaux's injuries8: Did they render him partially or totally dis­
1. Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux at 5, Pittsburgh & Conneaut 
Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2005) (No. 05-3425). 
2. Id. at 5-6. 




7. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2006), 
amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007); Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux, 
supra note 1, at 9; see also infra note 180 for comment regarding amended Pittsburgh & 
Conneaut Dock Co. decision. 
8. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625. 
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abled? Were they temporary and likely to improve with time, or 
had his injuries reached the maximum improvement through physi­
cal and cognitive therapy and were now permanent? More than 
two years after the injury occurred, Bordeaux, his employer, and a 
claims review officer from the Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs (OWCP)9 held an informal conference in an attempt to 
reach an agreement about the extent and nature of Bordeaux's 
injuries.10 
Although the parties tried to settle the dispute through infor­
mal proceedings, these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, 
and Bordeaux pursued a formal hearing before an administrative 
law judge (ALJ).u On January 21, 2004, the AU determined that 
Bordeaux was totally and permanently disabled and awarded disa­
bility benefits commensurate with injuries to that extent.12 The 
ALJ also assessed Bordeaux's attorney's fees to his employer,B 
pursuant to a provision in the workers' compensation statute con­
trolling Bordeaux's situation.14 The employer appealed the deci­
sion to the Benefits Review Board (BRB), which affirmed the 
determination of total and permanent disability, as well as the at­
torney fee award (albeit on different grounds within the same work­
9. The U.S. Department of Labor is an executive department designed "to foster, 
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve 
their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employ­
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). The Department has designated a number of agencies 
to carry out these objectives, including the Employment Standards Administration 
(ESA). U.S. Department of Labor, DOL Agencies, hUp:/Iwww.dol.gov/doUorganiza 
tion.htm (last visited May 15, 2009). The ESA is in turn responsible for "enhanc[ing] 
the welfare and protect[ing] the rights of [American] workers." U.S. Department of 
Labor, ESA Mission Statement, hup:/Iwww.dol.gov/esa/aboutlmission.htm (last visited 
May 15, 2009). The ESA created the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
(OWCP) to review and enforce financial protections available to injured workers cov­
ered under certain federal workers' compensation statutes. See id. Bordeaux was cov­
ered by such a federal statute, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 
and thus his claim was handled by the OWCP. It is worth noting that the OWCP repre­
sentatives that oversee the informal settlement proceedings are referred to in a variety 
of ways in judicial and legislative materials: deputy commissioner, claims review officer, 
claims officer, and reviewing authority. For the purposes of this Note, these terms are 
essentially the same and all refer to the individuals responsible for overseeing the initial 
stages of the dispute resolution process. 
10. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625. 
11. [d. at 62l. 
12. Id. at 620. 
13. Id. 
14. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-50 
(2000). As Bordeaux was engaged in maritime employment, he was a covered em­
ployee under § 902(3); thus, the subsequent dispute is governed by that Act. 
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ers' compensation statute).15 The employer again took issue with 
the determinations of the administrative review agencies and 
looked to the United States Court of Appeals for relief.16 
In August of 2006, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the determination 
that Bordeaux was totally and permanently disabled and awarded 
the benefits attending that status, but reversed the award of attor­
ney's fees (previously awarded under § 928(b)), citing the failure of 
the claims officer to comply with the specific provisions of the stat­
ute, namely his failure to make a written recommendation following 
the informal conference held four years earlier .17 In other words, 
six years after his injury occurred and his working career ended, 
Bordeaux was in the grievous position of having his total and per­
manent disability benefits-benefits he and his family needed in the 
absence of a paycheck, benefits the reviewing authorities deemed 
rightfully his on three separate occasions-now reduced by the cost 
to litigate his right to those benefits in the first place. 
What if Bordeaux, who was injured in Ohio, had been injured 
in California instead? Even if Bordeaux's claim had taken an iden­
tical procedural path, he may have prevailed on his claim for attor­
ney's fees given the current disparate treatment of attorney's fee 
awards under § 928(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act).18 Several jurisdictions rely 
strictly on the plain language of the statute to determine whether an 
attorney's fee award is appropriate,19 holding that if the procedural 
15. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. The Longshore and Har­
bor Workers' Compensation Act authorizes an award of attorney's fees in two situa­
tions. The main difference between them concerns whether the employer has "declined 
to pay any compensation," or paid some compensation and "thereafter a controversy 
develops over [an] amount of additional compensation, if any, to which the employee 
may be entitled." 33 U.S.c. § 928(a)-(b) (emphasis added). 
16. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. The appellate court re­
views the administrative determinations of the administrative law judge (AU) and the 
Benefits Review Board (BRB), but does so "on a limited basis." The appellate court's 
sole task is to determine whether substantial evidence supported the administrative de­
cision and whether the decision was in accordance with applicable law. Id. at 620-21. 
17. [d. at 629. For the text of 33 U.S.c. § 928(b), see infra note 105. 
18. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. § 928(b); see, 
e.g., Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that the absence of a written recommendation does not preclude recovery of claimant's 
attorney's fees). 
19. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d 616; Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc. v. 
Edwards, 398 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2005); Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000), modified on reh'g, 237 F.3d 409 
(5th Cir. 2000); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP, 474 
F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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steps detailed in the statute are not followed precisely by all parties 
involved, fee shifting is prohibited. On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit has persistently declined to read such rigidity into the stat­
ute.20 Instead, it turns to the underlying purpose of the LHWCA, 
which is to provide "quick recovery for valid workplace-injury 
claims without resort to the courts, and when [that] fails, claimants' 
full recovery of statutory benefits without reduction by the cost of 
legal services."21 Citing concerns about fairness, equity, and legisla­
tive intent, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad reading of the 
attorney's fees provision to carry out the legislative intent of quick 
and adequate recovery of valid workplace claims.22 
There has been ongoing tension between readings confined to 
the (alleged) "plain language" of the statute and those broader 
readings that look beyond the express language of the provision to 
fulfill the legislature'S objectives. In essence, the controversy boils 
down to a question of statutory interpretation. Although the 
weight of authority favors a strict reading requiring absolute adher­
ence to the procedures enumerated in 33 U.S.c. § 928, this Note 
posits that a broad reading is in fact more appropriate in a circum­
stance such as Bordeaux'S, where the inability to recoup attorney's 
fees is the direct result of the failures of others to discharge their 
statutory duties. This conclusion is reached after an examination of 
early workplace liability theory, workers' compensation law gener­
ally, the provisions of the LHWCA, the legislative concerns that the 
Act sought to address, and the policies that have been expressed in 
judicial opinions pertaining to the Act. 
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the liability theory 
in the workplace, the circumstances that gave rise to workers' com­
pensation law, and the policy considerations that underpin current 
workers' compensation legislation. Part II explores the genesis of 
workers' compensation for maritime workers, lays out the provi­
sions of the LHWCA, and reviews the judicial applications and in­
terpretations of the Act since its enactment in 1927. Part III 
examines the ways in which the courts have interpreted and applied 
20. Everitt v. OWCP, 107 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2004); Matulic v. OWCP, 154 
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998); Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding. Co., 606 F.2d 875; see also Savan­
nah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
deviation from provisions of § 928(b) does not preclude eventual recovery of attorney's 
fees). 
21. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 630. 
22. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding. Co., 606 F.2d 875; see also Matulic, 154 F.3d 1052; 
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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§ 928, the fee-shifting provision of the LHWCA,23 and scrutinizes 
the majority and dissenting opinions of a recent Sixth Circuit deci­
sion, which deftly illustrates the continuing disparate judicial treat­
ment of this provision of the LHWCA. 
Part IV analyzes the controversy in light of the general policies 
underpinning workers' compensation law, the congressional intent 
behind the LHWCA, and the precise language employed in the dis­
puted provision. This Note concludes that the current circuit split 
should be resolved in favor of a broad reading of § 928(b) to con­
form with the history, policy, and intent behind the LHWCA and 
workers' compensation statutes generally by allowing a claimant 
such as Bordeaux to recover the litigation costs incurred to estab­
lish his right to workers' compensation. 




Workers' compensation coverage is something many people 
take for granted-if an employee is injured while on the job, there 
are often provisions in place to cover medical bills, lost time, and if 
necessary, injuries resulting in disability. Workers' compensation 
did not always exist, however; it is a remedy that is little more than 
23. Statutory fee-shifting provisions represent a departure from the usual rule. In 
the United States, the successful litigant generally is not permitted to recover his attor­
ney's fees from the losing party. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness 
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); F.D. Rich Co., Inc. V. U.S. for the Use of Indus. Lumber 
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Fleishmann Distilling Corp. V. Maier Brewing Co., 386 
U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Stewart V. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 190 (1878); see also Day v. 
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851) (noting that state legislatures have "re­
fused to allow the honorarium paid to counsel to be exacted from the losing party"); 
Arcambel V. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (noting that the inclusion of 
attorney's fees in an award for damages is generally opposed). This general rule, 
known as the "American Rule," is still firmly rooted in American jurisprudence, al­
though a number of exceptions to the rule have developed in response to concerns 
about justice and equity. See, e.g., F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (recognizing that attor­
ney's fee awards are appropriate when the losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexa­
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" (citing Vaughan V. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 
(1962»); see also id. at 130 (acknowledging that fee shifting is appropriate when the 
prevailing party "has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the 
court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members 
of the benefited class" (citing Hall V. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1974»). The most common class 
of exceptions to the American Rule, however, is one created by Congress. 1 MARY 
FRANCIS DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES <JI 5.01[1], 
at 5-3 (2008). Statutory provisions providing for fee shifting are now common and 
widespread. See id. One such legislated exception to the American Rule forms the 
very basis of this Note. See Part III, infra, for further discussion of the fee-shifting 
provision within the LHWCA. 
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a century 01d.24 Subpart A of this Part looks at common law reme­
dies available to injured workers before the modern workers' com­
pensation system. Subpart B discusses the Industrial Revolution 
and the socioeconomic pressures that changed the way workplace 
injuries were handled in the legislature and judiciary. Subpart C 
outlines the basic policies underpinning modern workers' compen­
sation legislation. 
A. Liability for Workers' Injuries Under the Common Law 
Two hundred years ago, the occurrence of workplace injuries 
was rare.25 When a worker did sustain an injury on the job, the 
employer, often working closely and being friendly with the em­
ployee, might have provided the necessary medical care and finan­
cial assistance out of sympathy.26 Absent this emotional response 
on the part of the employer, the injured worker's only alternative 
was to seek redress by suing the employer, alleging negligence of a 
common law duty.27 At that time, the duties imposed on an em­
ployer under the common law were few: (1) to provide a safe place 
to work; (2) to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment; (3) to 
give warnings of dangers of which the employee might be unaware; 
(4) to provide a sufficient number of fit, trained, or suitable fellow 
servants to perform assigned tasks; and (5) to promulgate and en­
force rules relating to employee conduct that would make the work 
safe.28 In order for a worker to recover for injuries sustained, the 
worker had to demonstrate a violation of one of the duties listed 
above and, thus, that the employer was somehow at fault for the 
worker's injury.29 
24. See infra Part I.C 
25. See SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COM­
PENSATION LAWS 2 (1944). 
26. ld. 
27. ld.; Samuel B. Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's 
Compensation, reprinted in CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 466-67 
(1947) [hereinafter Horovitz, Current Trends]. 
28. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
TEXT § 4.30 (1984). 
29. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 466-67. 

For generations one person's liability to another was based on fault, or negli­

gence. If none existed, there was no redress. Too bad that the worker lost a 

leg, or arm, or eye, in the factory, or at work elsewhere; but the employer not 

being at fault, it was inconceivable to the early judges that the employer 

should be held liable, or in any way be compelled to contribute toward medi­

cal treatment or the support of the worker or his family. No fault, no liability. 
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Notwithstanding the lengthy and costly process of filing suit 
and the additional strain placed on an already physically and finan­
cially impaired worker,3° the employee's claim had little likelihood 
of success in the face of the three common law defenses available to 
employers: the doctrines of (1) contributory negligence; (2) assump­
tion of risk; and (3) the fellow-servant rule.31 Even if the worker 
could demonstrate the direct negligence of the employer, "recovery 
would be defeated by the [contributory] negligence-even much 
smaller in degree-of the employee."32 Similarly, if workers com­
prehended (or should have comprehended) risks inherent in dis­
charging their duties and assumed those risks anyway, "the 
employee[s], being free to do as [they] please[], and voluntarily un­
dergoing the dangerous conditions of the work, [have] no standing 
to complain when injury does occur as a result of [those] condi­
tions."33 Finally, if the injury sustained by the worker was not 
caused by the employer personally, but rather by a fellow em­
ployee, the employer was not liable for the injury under the theory 
that the negligence of another employee was one of the risks as­
sumed by accepting employment.34 The fellow-servant rule was 
particularly damaging to claims for recovery, since an employer 
could avoid liability under this doctrine entirely by simply staying 
Id. 
30. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that once suit had been filed, an in­
jured worker often faced a wait of two or more years before reaching trial and that "his 
limited savings and public charity bore the burden" in the interim). 
31. Id. at 2-3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 467; see also Owens v. 
Union Pac. RR Co., 319 U.S. 715,720-24 (1943) (discussing the scope and application 
of each common law defense (citing Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Mees & W. 1 (1837))). The 
contributory negligence doctrine permits an employer to escape liability for an em­
ployee's injury when the employer can demonstrate that, even though the employer has 
been negligent in some capacity, the injured worker was also somehow negligent, and 
thus played a role in his own injury. The assumption of risk defense is grounded in the 
notion that the employee is free to object to dangerous working conditions and, if the 
employee chooses to work in them, he has no standing to complain when he is injured 
as a result of them. The fellow-servant rule allows an employer to avoid liability when 
an employee has been injured as a result of conduct by another employee, the theory 
being that the employer cannot be held accountable for the actions of its staff. See 
generally LARSON, supra note 28, § 4.30 (describing the common law defenses and the 
general problems attendant thereto). For a detailed discussion of the factual and legal 
foundation for the holding in the British case Priestly v. Fowler, which established early 
common law pertaining to employer defenses to negligence, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, 
LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 100-34 (1995). 
32. LARSON, supra note 28, § 4.30. 
33. Id. 
34. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 
467. 
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out of the workplace.35 Of the small number of cases that did sur­
vive to trial and were ultimately successful, the worker's "victory" 
was a hollow one; "lawyer's fees, doctor's bills and other expenses 
often ate up a substantial portion of the award. "36 
Returning to the circumstances of Bordeaux's injury detailed 
in the Introduction, how would he have fared under the common 
law? Even if Bordeaux could marshal a valid argument that his 
employer had neglected its duty to provide a safe place to work, or 
failed to provide warning of dangers about which Bordeaux was un­
aware, or did not provide trained and suitable coworkers to accom­
plish the employment tasks with which they were charged, it seems 
that Bordeaux's employer could almost certainly defeat his claim 
with one or more of the three defenses outlined above. The com­
pany might argue that Bordeaux was in part to blame for his injury 
because, by bending over (rather than kneeling) to clear the pipe, 
he exposed the area at the base of his head and neck left unpro­
tected by his hard hat. Alternatively, his employer might argue that 
in accepting a position that he knew to involve heavy machinery 
and tools and in subsequently climbing into the pit to clear the in­
take pipe, he assumed the risk that one of those heavy objects 
might fall and injure him. The employer's strongest argument 
under the common law would likely be the fellow-servant defense, 
since it was a fellow employee, and not his employer personally, 
who dropped the sandbag that injured him. Overall, Bordeaux's 
ability to establish any liability under the common law on the part 
of his employer seems very unlikely. Since Bordeaux had no expe­
rience or ability to secure alternate employment,37 he and his family 
would have to rely on any savings and the charity of friends and his 
community for support for the remainder of his life: a brutal and 
inequitable reality. 
B. 	 The Industrial Revolution and Resulting Socioeconomic 
Pressures 
While the common law remedies affected relatively few people 
in this country's early years of agricultural and rural life, the num­
ber of people affected by these inadequate remedies exploded once 
35. 	 HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 
467. 
36. 	 HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 4; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 
467. 
37. See Fmal Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux, supra note 1, at 13-14 
(describing Bordeaux'S limited education, narrow work experience, and advanced age). 
841 2009] FORM OVER SUBSTANCE? 
the Industrial Revolution began.38 Responding to increasing pres­
sure from injured workers and union representatives, some courts 
modified the existing common law fellow-servant defense with the 
vice-principal exception.39 This exception basically excluded em­
ployees charged with carrying out the employer's common law du­
ties to provide a safe work environment, adequate tools, and 
suitably-trained coworkers, from the group of employees to be con­
sidered the injured employee's "fellow-servant[s]."4o Similarly, 
state and federal governments passed legislation that chipped away 
at the draconian results of the common law, but these legislative 
modifications continued to center on fault, rather than the relation­
ship of the employee to the employer.41 Despite the judicial and 
legislative modifications, the basic provisions of the common law 
were still intact and binding upon the courtS.42 
38. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 466 ("As the factory system grew, 
as industries of all kinds brought large numbers of workers into close contact with ma­
chinery and with each other, the number of injuries and fatalities skyrocketed. Injured 
workers and their dependents were compelled to look to the courts for redress. "). 
39. See, e.g., New Eng. RR Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323, 345 (1899). An em­
ployer's liability for the negligence of an employee that injures another hinges on: 
the character of the act . . . . If the act is one done in the discharge of some 
[common law] duty of the master to the servant, then negligence in that act is 
the negligence of the master; but if it be not one in the discharge of such 
[common law] duty, then there should be some personal wrong on the part of 
the employer before he is held liable therefor. 
[d. See generally Bait. & Ohio RR Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 386-90 (1893) (provid­
ing in-depth discussion of the duties of the master to the servant, as well as the scope of 
same). 
40. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 386-90; see also LARSON, supra note 28, 
§ 4.40 (noting that the vice-principal exception was "[t]he principal modification of the 
common law defenses"). 
41. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1,35 Stat. 65, 65 
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.c. § 51 (2000}) (eliminated contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk defenses in cases involving safety violations); Georgia Act of 1855, 
1855 Ga. Laws 155 (eliminated the fellow-servant defense for railroad employers); LAR­
SON, supra note 28, § 4.50 ("These so-called employers' liability statutes did not aspire 
to create any new principle of liability applicable to the employment relation as such. 
The most they ever set out to accomplish was the restoration of the employee to a 
position no worse than that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer or 
his servants. "). 
42. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 468; see also W. Indemnity Co. v. 
Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 401 (Cal. 1915) ("[T]hese statutes, one and all, rest on the underly­
ing notion that the common-law remedy by action, with the requirements of proof inci­
dent to that remedy, involves intolerable delay and great economic waste, gives 
inadequate relief for loss and suffering, operates unequally as between different individ­
uals in like circumstances, and that, whether viewed from the standpoint of the em­
ployer or that of the employe, it is inequitable and unsuited to the conditions of modem 
industry. "). 
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Responding to the voting power of the people increasingly af­
fected by injuries and death in the Industrial Age,43 state govern­
ments began to acknowledge the need for a radical overhaul of the 
current treatment of workplace injury claims.44 Taking cues from a 
German model of workers' compensation legislation which com­
pensated employees based on their role as employees, rather than 
as simply parties injured due to the negligence of another,45 various 
state governments formed commissions at the turn of the century to 
evaluate potential solutions to the workers' compensation prob­
lem.46 Although application of the first state workers' compensa­
tion statutes were delayed on constitutional grounds,47 the new 
objectives underpinning these first enactments were clear: 
[T]o make the risk of the accident one of the industry itself, to 
follow from the fact of the injury, and hence that compensation 
on account thereof should be treated as an element in the cost of 
production, added to the cost of the article and borne by the 
community in general. 
[T]o substitute a more humanitarian and economical system of 
compensation for injured workmen or their dependents in case of 
their death; to provide a speedy and inexpensive method by 
which such compensation might be made to such employees or 
43. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 468. 
44. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20; see also HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 6; 1 
WILLIAM R. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 2 (1932); Horovitz, 
Current Trends, supra note 27, at 469. 
Legislate as we may in the line of stringent requirements for safety devices ... 
the army of the injured will still increase, the price of our manufacturing great­
ness will still have to be paid in human blood and tears. To speak of the com­
mon-law personal injury action as a remedy for this problem is to jest with 
serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks for food. 
HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 6 (quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis. 
1911». 
45. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 5; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 
469; see also LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20. 
46. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20. 
47. Franklin v. United Railway & Electric Co., 2 Bait. City Rep. 309 (1904), held 
unconstitutional a 1902 Maryland law establishing an "accident fund" for injured min­
ers on the basis that it violated the separation of powers doctrine and deprived the 
defendant of a jury trial. Similarly, Cunningham v. Nonhwestern Improvement Co., 119 
P. 554 (Mont. 1911), held unconstitutional a 1908 Montana law creating an indemnity 
fund to compensate injured employees on the grounds that, once compensation had 
been paid under the statute, the employer was still potentially liable in the courts for 
damages. In other words, the statute failed to provide the employer with equal protec­
tion of the laws by potentially subjecting it to double payments. See HOROVITZ, supra 
note 25, at 6; LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 
469-70. 
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those dependent upon them and which is more in harmony with 
modern methods of industry .... [and] to substitute a more uni­
form scale of compensation in case of accidental injury or death, 
than the ordinary varying and widely divergent estimates of 
.. 48Junes .... 
Consequently, once the constitutional issues had been resolved, 
adoption of workers' compensation legislation was rapid. By 1920, 
employees in the vast majority of states could recover for their em­
ployment injuries under newly enacted workers' compensation 
statutes.49 
C. Modern Workers' Compensation Legis/ation 
More than a century has gone by since Maryland passed the 
first workers' compensation statute in 1902.50 In that time, the state 
and federal governments have wrestled with the boundaries of com­
pensation legislation, but overall have exhibited a general tendency 
towards enlarging the scope of coverage as to the types of activities, 
persons, injuries (and more recently, diseases51), and occupations 
covered.52 As of 1995, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated six 
basic objectives underlying workers' compensation legislation: 
1. To provide sure, prompt and reasonable income and med­
ical benefits to work-accident victims, or income benefits to their 
dependents, regardless of fault; 
2. To provide a single remedy and reduce court delays, costs 
and workloads arising out of personal injury litigation; 
3. To relieve public and private charities of financial drains 
incidental to uncompensated industrial accidents; 
4. To eliminate payment of fees to lawyers and witnesses as 
well as to time-consuming trials and appeals; 
5. To encourage maximum employer interest in safety and 
rehabilitation through appropriate experience-rating mecha­
nisms; and 
48. 1 SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 2, 4-5; see, e.g., Bundy v. Vt. State Highway 
Dep't, 146 A. 68, 69 (Vt. 1929) ("The ultimate purpose of the Workmen's Compensa­
tion Act ... is to treat the cost of personal injuries incidental to the employment as part 
of the cost of the business. "). 
49. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.30. 
50. ld. § 5.20. 
5!. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 
§ 401, 83 Stat. 742, 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000» (providing 
compensation benefits for coal miners totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, or "black 
lung disease," arising out of their work in coal mines). 
52. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.30. 
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6. To promote frank study of causes of accidents-rather 
than concealment of fault-reducing preventable accidents and 
human suffering. 53 
Much has changed about the way workplace injuries are han­
dled since the pre-Industrial Revolution era. Although workers' 
compensation, as a body of law, is now accepted as a "given," it 
took time for it to spread to the great number of industries that it 
affects today. The first attempts to secure compensation for injuries 
sustained, whether under the common law or the initial workers' 
compensation statutes, were made by employees of the railroad and 
mining industries. 54 The LHWCA covers employees engaged in 
maritime employment,55 and just like any other industry that pres­
ently enjoys the protections of a workers' compensation statute, it 
took time for the legislature to promulgate workers' compensation 
laws that covered maritime workers specifically. 




Just as the first state workers' compensation statutes were 
struck down as unconstitutional, the same was true for the prelimi­
nary attempts to apply state law compensation law to maritime 
workers.56 The first attempt was Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 
which involved a claim for death benefits under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of New YorkY The dispute hinged largely on 
jurisdictional issues, namely, that the decedent was engaged in mar­
itime employment, and jurisdiction over maritime matters is dele­
gated exclusively to the federal government pursuant to Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution.58 Accordingly, the Court held that 
53. MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 2 (1997) (citing U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1995 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 
(1995». 
54. See, e.g., Owens v. Union Pac. RR Co., 319 U.S. 715 (1943); New Eng. RR 
Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323, 345 (1899); Bait. & Ohio RR Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 
386-90 (1893); w. Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 401 (Cal. 1915); Franklin v. 
United Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 BaIt. City Rep. 309 (Md. 1904); Cunningham v. Nw. Improve­
ment Co., 119 P. 554 (Mont. 1911). 
55. 33 U.S.c. § 902(3) (2000). 
56. Washington v. W.c. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924); Knickerbocker 
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
57. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. 
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."). See generally Charles 
Clark, The Expanding Coverage o/the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compen­
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the New York statute was invalid in that it appropriated power ex­
clusively within the jurisdiction of the federal government.59 
The next attempt to apply state compensation law to maritime 
workers came in 1920 with Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,60 
which failed for similar jurisdictional reasons. After the decision in 
Jensen, the Congress explicitly reserved jurisdiction over workers' 
compensation law of any state to the district courtS.61 Yet, the Su­
preme Court struck down this attempt to apply state compensation 
law to maritime employees, stating that the Constitution gave Con­
gress a nondelegable power to legislate admiralty and maritime 
law.62 
Finally recognizing the need to legislate directly, Congress pro­
vided workers' compensation coverage to maritime employees 
when it enacted the LHWCA in 1927. Subpart A that follows 
briefly discusses the basic features of the 1927 enactment, as well as 
the notable changes incorporated by the amendments in 1972 and 
1984. Subpart B discusses the policies that have emerged from judi­
cial application of the LHWCA. 
A. LHWCA: Original Enactment and Amendments 
The original version of the LHWCA63 had a simple stated goal: 
"[t]o provide compensation for disability or death resulting from 
injury to employees in certain maritime employments."64 The sub­
sation Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 849 (1983); Charles F. Tucker, Coverage and Procedure 
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Subsequent to the 
1972 Amendments, 55 TuL. L. REv. 1056 (1981) (discussing the Jensen case in greater 
detail, along with the jurisdictional issues that remained even after the passage of the 
LHWCA). 
59. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217-18. 
60. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
61. Id. at 156. 
62. Id. at 164 (referencing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8). Four years after the Knicker­
bocker decision, the Supreme Court issued yet another opinion on the inapplicability of 
state compensation laws to maritime workers. Perhaps realizing that Congress had not 
picked up on the subtleties of the previous two decisions, it took a more direct approach 
in Washington v. W.e. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), when it stated: 
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law 
by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This 
power, we think, would permit enactment of a general Employers' Liability 
Law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not 
be delegated to the several states. 
Id. at 227. 
63. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.s.C. §§ 901-950 (2000)). 
64. /d. 
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sections of the Act defined the injuries covered,65 definitions and 
exclusiveness of liability,66 and claims procedures (including proce­
dure for claims that the employer disputed).67 However, the origi­
nal enactment did not include the fee-shifting provision for 
attorney's fees that appeared in later versions. Instead, section 28 
of the 1927 LHWCA limited any claim for fees for services to those 
which the deputy commissioner specifically approved, and those 
fees that were approved constituted a lien on the compensation 
award,68 effectively reducing the funds actually awarded to the in­
jured employee, as in other areas of litigation that follow the Amer­
ican Rule.69 Despite being drafted and enacted in the early stages 
of workers' compensation law, the 1927 version of the LHWCA re­
mained largely intact for nearly fifty years. 
The LHWCA underwent a major overhaul in 1972, in part to 
clarify and expand the class of employees that came under the juris­
diction of the LHWCAJo In addition to expanding the class of 
65. Id. § 3(a) ("Compensation shall be payable under this Act ... only if the 
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the 
United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery ... may not validly be provided 
by State law."). 
66. Id. § 4(b) ("Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for 
the injury."); Id. § 5 ("The liability ... prescribed ... shall be exclusive ... except that if 
an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act, [the in­
jured worker] may elect to ... maintain an action at law or in admiralty.... 
[D]efendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of 
a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that 
the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee."). 
67. Id. §§ 12-23. 
68. Id. § 28(a). 
69. See supra note 23 for discussion of the American Rule. 
70. See generally Clark, supra note 58, at 852-54; Tucker, supra note 58, at 1056­
60. Under the 1927 LHWCA, the express language of the statute confined coverage 
only to those employees injured "upon the navigable waters of the United States" when 
recovery is not "validly" available under state law. Longshoremen's and Harbor Work­
ers' Compensation Act § 3(a). The courts struggled with this bright jurisdictional line 
between state and federal claims, since the nature of some employment and resulting 
claims left unclear whether the state or federal compensation legislation properly ap­
plied (this jurisdictional grey area later became known as the "twilight zone"). See 
Clark, supra note 58, at 853. Applying for compensation in the wrong forum could 
potentially leave the worker without any recovery at all due to expiration of the perti­
nent statute of limitations. See Thcker, supra note 58, at 1059. Although the courts 
eventually developed a concurrent jurisdiction doctrine to address "twilight zone" cov­
erage issues, additional interpretive questions arose as to whether maritime workers 
injured on the shores ide of the twilight zone could still be covered under the LHWCA. 
Id.; see also Clark, supra note 58, at 853. The judiciary, however, was unwilling to 
accept and apply this interpretation in the absence of Congressional authority. Clark, 
supra note 58, at 853 n.37. Congress addressed these issues directly in the 1972 Amend­
ments to the LHWCA. 
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workers whose injuries would fall within the scope of the 
LHWCA71 and increasing benefit awards for those workers (or 
their families in the case of death),n the 1972 Amendments elimi­
nated the requirement that the injured employee have no valid re­
covery available under state law to be eligible for LHWCA 
coverage.73 The Amendments also reformed and standardized ad­
ministrative procedures concerning claims for compensation.74 This 
included two changes to the decision review process: access to an 
internal administrative review75 and, more significantly for the pur­
poses of this Note, the addition of an attorney fee-shifting provision 
for injured employees forced to resort to the services of an attorney 
to secure the compensation benefits the employer was unwilling to 
pay.76 Overall, the sweeping changes enacted by the 1972 Amend­
ments were evidence of the congressional intent "to provide a mod­
ern workmen's compensation program for a substantial number of 
American workers and their families."77 
B. Judicial Application of the LHWCA 
Since the LHWCA's enactment in 1927, the courts that apply 
its provisions have consistently and repeatedly stressed the impor­
tance of liberal application in favor of the injured worker.78 This 
71. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(c), 86 Stat. 1251, 1251 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.c. 
902 (2000» (expanding coverage to those injuries occurring on navigable waters to in­
clude "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or 
other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in the loading, unloading, repair­
ing, or building a vessel"). 
72. Id. § 5. 
73. Id. § 2(c). 
74. Id. § 14. 
75. Id. § 15. A worker had to resort directly to the district court for review of any 
compensation award under the LHWCA of 1927. 
76. Id. § 13; see infra Part III. 
77. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,4711 (empha­
sis added). Congress passed another Amendment to the LHWCA in 1984, but the 
changes enacted did not substantively change matters relating to the claims review pro­
cess that is of primary concern in this Note. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen­
sation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950). 
78. See OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1983); Voris v. 
Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 333 (1953) ("This Act must be liberally construed in conformance 
with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." (citing Bait. 
& Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932))}; Pillsbury v. United Eng'g 
Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952) ("[T]his is a humanitarian Act, and ... should be con­
strued liberally to effectuate its purposes."); Bait. & Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. 408; 
Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939); Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. 
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subpart will review some of the key decisions that have shaped the 
judiciary's treatment of the Act. 
Only five years after the LHWCA was enacted, the Court's de­
cision in Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton 79 estab­
lished some basic policy considerations still in use today. While the 
specific facts of the case are somewhat unremarkable,80 the Court 
made the following statement as to its approach in construing and 
applying the statute: 
[Workers' compensation] laws operate to relieve persons suffer­
ing such misfortunes of a part of the burden and to distribute it to 
the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are 
deemed to be in the public interest and should be construed liber­
ally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted and, 
if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results.81 
In the decade that followed, several Federal Courts of Appeal 
decisions reinforced the importance of liberal application. In 
Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. Lowe,82 an employee of Candado 
Stevedoring Corporation was injured while working on a barge 
owned by Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.83 The injured employee origi­
nally filed suit against the barge owner, alleging negligence for a 
defective hatch cover,84 but later, for reasons not within the record, 
had a default judgment entered against him. The court subse­
quently entered a decree absolving the barge owner of liability 
entirely.85 
At some point after the court decree was entered, the claimant 
also filed a claim for compensation from his employer, Candado, 
Lowe, 85 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1936); see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 
887,889 (9th Cir. 1993); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assocs., Inc., 655 F.2d 589, 592 
(5th Cir. 1981); Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The 
effort in every case should ... be to follow the Supreme Court's twice-voiced directive 
that the Longshoremen's Act 'must be liberally construed in conformance with its pur­
pose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.' "). 
79. Bait. & Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. 408. 
80. The claim, brought by the employer of an injured longshore worker, involved 
a dispute over the computation method of the claimant's compensation award, as deter­
mined by the application of various equations based on the type and duration of disabil­
ity suffered. Id. at 410-12. 
81. Id. at 414 (emphasis added) (citing Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 
(1930». 
82. Can dado Stevedoring Corp., 85 F.2d 119. 
83. Id. at 120. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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and was awarded compensation to be paid by the employer.86 The 
employer appealed the award to the Second Circuit Court of Ap­
peals, arguing that the earlier default in the case against the barge 
owner amounted to a forfeiture of his right to compensation.87 Up­
holding the claimant's award from the deputy commissioner and 
lower court, the Second Circuit restated that the right to compensa­
tion ought to be "treated in a liberal spirit and only denied where 
some injustice or injury to the employer appears."88 Noting that 
the employer failed to preserve the issue on which it later relied, 
the court went on to comment that "[t]he right of the employee 
should not be defeated by mere technicalities."89 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit weighed in on the 
issue of application in Southern Steamship Co. v. Norton. 90 The 
claimant in that case, Jackson, sustained a back injury and was sent 
to his employer's physician for evaluation and treatment.91 After a 
month of treatment, Jackson returned to his job for four days but 
was dismissed for reasons unrelated to his injury.92 The compensa­
tion claim submitted to the deputy commissioner resulted in a de­
termination of partial disability, which, in turn, resulted in reduced 
earning capacity and an associated compensation award.93 
The employer sought judicial review of the award, arguing that 
Jackson's dismissal for independent reasons precluded his partial 
disability recovery on the grounds of decreased earning capacity.94 
Once the case reached the Third Circuit, the court noted that the 
employer was essentially requesting that it reweigh the evidence al­
ready assessed by the deputy commissioner.95 Refusing to do so, 
the court pointed out that its role was simply to assess whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the deputy commissioner's 
determination, as evaluated against "a liberal construction of the 




88. Id. at 121. 
89. Id. 
90. Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939). 




95. See id. at 826-27. 
96. Id. at 827 (citing BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 404, 414 
(1932); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Burris, 59 F.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1932)) . 
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In just over a decade, these three decisions ushered in an estab­
lished preference for a liberal construction of the LHWCA in favor 
of the injured worker, and subsequent decisions only reinforced this 
approach.97 One case even upheld a compensation award in the 
absence of written notice of injury to the employer, ostensibly a 
requirement under § 912 of the LHWCA.98 In Voris v. Eikel, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a worker seriously injured in an 
incident witnessed by many people, including at least one supervi­
sor,99 despite the claimant's failure to submit written notice of in­
jury to his employer until long after the thirty-day notice window 
had lapsed.1°o Noting its duty to construe the statute liberally so as 
to avoid "harsh and incongruous results," the Court reviewed the 
circumstances of the injury and rejected the employer's argument 
that the claim for compensation was defeated due to lack of suffi­
97. See OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1983); Voris v. 
Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 333 (1953) ("This Act must be liberally construed in conformance 
with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." (citing Bait. 
& Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. at 414)); Pillsbury v. United Eng'g Co., 342 U.S. 197, 
200 (1952) ("[T]his is a humanitarian Act, and ... should be construed liberally to 
effectuate its purposes ...."); see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887, 
889 (9th Cir. 1993); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assocs., Inc., 655 F.2d 589, 592 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The effort 
in every case should ... be to follow the Supreme Court's twice-voiced directive that 
the Longshoremen's Act 'must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, 
and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.'" (quoting Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 
373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963); Voris, 346 U.S at 333)). 
98. Voris, 346 U.S 328. The original language of 33 U.S.c. § 912 provides, in part: 
(a) Notice of an injury or death in respect of which compensation is pay­
able under this Act shall be given within thirty days after the date of such 
injury or death (1) to the deputy commissioner in the compensation district in 
which such injury occurred and (2) to the employer. 
(b) Such notice shall be in writing, shall contain the name and address of 
the employee and a statement of the time, place, nature, and cause of injury or 
death, and shall be signed by the employee or by some person on his behalf 
(d) Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim under this Act (1) if 
the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the 
injury occurred) or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the 
deputy commissioner determines that the employer or carrier has not been 
prejudiced by failure to give such notice, or (2) if the deputy commissioner 
excuses such failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason such no­
tice could not be given .... 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 12, 44 Stat. 1424, 
1431 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.c. § 912 (2000)). 
99. Voris, 346 U.S. at 330-32. 
100. Id. at 330. 
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cient notice. lOi The LHWCA, it held, was "designed to provide 
compensation for the included workers, regardless of whether writ­
ten notice was given. "102 In sum, the courts have established a long 
and consistent record of liberal application of the LHWCA to an 
injured worker's claim for compensation benefits. 
III. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER § 928(b) 
So what's the problem? The LHWCA was enacted to provide 
injured maritime workers access to workers' compensation benefits 
similar to those available to their landward peers,103 and court rul­
ings since its inception indicate a clear preference toward liberal 
interpretation that will award those benefits to the injured em­
ployee.104 It seems only logical then that the courts' decisions 
would reflect this longstanding preference on all provisions of the 
LHWCA, including those for attorney's fees. 
Section 928 of the current version of the LHWCA provides for 
an award of attorney's fees in two distinct circumstances.105 Sub­
101. [d. at 332-34. The claimant was injured when a flash fire broke out in the 
hold of a ship, causing workers to "fle[e] in terror." [d. at 330. In the midst of the 
commotion, with many people present, the claimant was struck by a beam with such 
force that the blow rendered him unable to walk. [d. Immediately thereafter, several 
of his supervisors were orally informed of the serious injury, and one such supervisor 
maneuvered the claimant to his car, drove him home, and promised to take him to a 
doctor. [d. at 332. Despite this course of events, formal written notice was not submit­
ted until six months after the accident, and the employer tried to use this fact as lever­
age to escape liability, alleging that 33 U.S.c. § 912( d) is not satisfied unless the 
employer has "actual personal knowledge of the injury." [d. Citing ample evidence 
that the employer had actual notice of the injury and the supervisors' failure to follow 
internal injury reporting procedures, the court declined to accept the employer's argu­
ment, decrying it as "indefensible." [d. 
102. [d. at 334. 
103. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, at Introduction 
(stating that the purpose of the Act is "[t]o provide compensation for disability or death 
resulting from injury to employees in certain maritime employments"). 
104. See BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408 (1932); Southern 
S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939); Can dado Stevedoring Corp. v. Lowe, 85 
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1936); cases cited supra note 97. 
105. Section 928 provides in part: 
(a) If the employer or carrier declines to pay any compensation on or 
before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim for compensa­
tion having been filed from the deputy commissioner, on the ground that there 
is no liability for compensation within the provisions of this chapter and the 
person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attor­
ney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall be awarded, in 
addition to the award of compensation, in a compensation order, a reasonable 
attorney's fee against the employer or carrier in an amount approved by the 
deputy commissioner, Board, or court, as the case may be, which shall be paid 
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section (a) of § 928 addresses the circumstances in which an em­
ployer has refused to pay any compensation after receipt of notice 
of injury and the claimant is thereafter successful in securing com­
pensation benefits with the assistance of counseL Subsection (b) 
covers those circumstances in which the employer has paid some 
compensation after receipt of notice of injury, but the precise com­
pensation due is disputed by the employer and employee. In such a 
case, subsection (b) provides a procedure for the employee, em­
ployer, and reviewing authority to follow in resolving the dispute. 
If the dispute is resolved in favor of the employee who secures com­
pensation in addition to that which the employer originally paid, a 
reasonable attorney's fee "shall" be awarded.106 
When Congress drafted the attorney's fee provisions of the 
LHWCA, it likely envisioned a § 928(b) dispute to play out as fol­
lows: First, the employer would offer some compensation to its em­
ployee following a workplace injury, but the parties would 
ultimately disagree on the precise amount of compensation due. 
The parties would refer the dispute to an OWCP claims officer who 
would schedule an informal conference between the parties in an 
attempt to mediate a settlement. After the informal conference, 
the claims officer, having heard arguments from both employer and 
directly by the employer or carrier to the attorney for the claimant in a lump 
sum after the compensation order becomes final. 
(b) If the employer or carrier pays or tenders payment of compensation 
without an award pursuant to section 914 (a) and (b) of this title, and thereaf­
ter a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation, if any, 
to which the employee may be entitled, the deputy commissioner or Board 
shall set the matter for an informal conference and following such conference 
the deputy commissioner or Board shall recommend in writing a disposition of 
the controversy. If the employer or carrier refuse to accept such written rec­
ommendation, within fourteen days after its receipt by them, they shall payor 
tender to the employee in writing the additional compensation, if any, to 
which they believe the employee is entitled. If the employee refuses to accept 
such payment or tender of compensation, and thereafter utilizes the services of 
an attorney at law, and if the compensation thereafter awarded is greater than 
the amount paid or tendered by the employer or carrier, a reasonable attor­
ney's fee based solely upon the difference between the amount awarded and 
the amount tendered or paid shall be awarded in addition to the amount of 
compensation. . . . If the claimant is successful in review proceedings before 
the Board or court in any such case an award may be made in favor of the 
claimant and against the employer or carrier for a reasonable attorney's fee 
for claimant's counsel in accord with the above provisions. In all other cases 
any claim for legal services shall not be assessed against the employer or 
carrier. 
33 U.S.c. § 928(a)-(b) (2000). 
106. Id. § 928(b). 
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employee, would issue a written recommendation suggesting the 
terms of settlement. If both parties accepted the recommendation, 
the dispute was settled. If the employer refused to accept the rec­
ommendation, the employer might choose to make a second offer 
of settlement. If the employee was still dissatisfied with the offer 
tendered and subsequently obtained a greater award through for­
mal proceedings with the help of an attorney, § 928(b) provides a 
mechanism by which the employee could recoup the legal fees she 
incurred to secure the additional compensation. 
Although the procedure outlined in the statute seems fairly 
straightforward on paper, compliance has proven difficult in prac­
tice. The controversy and the topic of this Note, centers on the re­
quired degree of compliance with the procedure in subsection 
(b).1D7 Must each step be followed precisely in order to authorize 
an award of attorney's fees to the successful claimant? Is substan­
tial compliance sufficient? Curiously, the Courts of Appeals do not 
agree on the circumstances that warrant attorney's fees under 
§ 928, and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. The 
controversy regarding § 928(b) essentially boils down to a question 
of statutory interpretation: are the provisions outlined in the sec­
tion properly treated as rigid preconditions to recovery or merely as 
procedural elements to the dispute resolution process? Subpart A 
of this Part discusses the historical disagreement between the cir­
cuits and their respective reasoning on the issue. Finally, subpart B 
discusses a recent decision in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, which served as the Circuit's first opinion on the issue of 
attorney's fees awarded under § 928(b), and attempts to discover 
whether the decision settles the dispute or simply further confuses 
an already complex issue. 
A. The Circuit Split 
1. 	 The Ninth Circuit: National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued one of the 
first major decisions interpreting § 928(b) in National Steel & Ship­
107. While the focus of this Note is solely on the controversy around subsection 
(b) of § 928 of the LHWCA, it is worth noting that there is also some dispute about the 
circumstances giving rise to a proper award of attorney's fees under subsection (a). 
Disagreement exists as to what constitutes a failure to pay "any" compensation under 
the subsection, what formality is required to constitute "filing a claim," and how the 
courts should handle supplemental claims (i.e., a temporary total disability that later 
gives rise to a permanent partial disability claim stemming from the same injury). 
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building Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.108 The 
employee, Holston, injured his right knee while working for Na­
tional Steel in August of 1974,109 and his employer paid temporary 
total disability benefits under the LHWCA between the date of in­
jury and his return to work in May 1975.110 Holston filed a claim 
for permanent partial disability benefits two months later, appar­
ently still suffering from the injury.111 The claimant and his em­
ployer, National Steel, were unable to agree either on the extent of 
the injury, or his average weekly wage,11Z and submitted the dispute 
to an informal conference before an assistant deputy commissioner 
from the Department of Labor.113 The informal conference, which 
took place on January 26, 1976, did not resolve the dispute, and the 
Commissioner referred the matter directly to formal hearing before 
an AU, without issuing any written recommendation as to the how 
the dispute ought to be resolved.1l4 The ALJ sided with Holston's 
assertions as to the weekly wage he was entitled to,115 as well as the 
extent of the permanent partial disability.116 The ALJ further or­
dered the employer to pay $1200 of Holston's attorney's fees pursu­
ant to § 928(b).117 The employer appealed to the BRB, which not 
only affirmed the ALl's determinations, but also assessed an addi­
tional $1200 in attorney's fees for the claimant's representation dur­
ing the appeal.118 The employer again appealed.119 
Holston's employer argued that an award of attorney's fees 
under § 928(b) was improper because the deputy commissioner did 
not issue a written recommendation for the employer to accept or 
108. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1979). 
109. Id. at 877. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. An injured worker's average weekly wage serves as the basis upon which 
compensation amounts are calculated for the great majority of disabilities. See 33 
V.S.c. §§ 908-910 (2000). 
113. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 606 F.2d at 877. 
114. Id. 
115. Holston asserted that his weekly wage was $244.66 at the time of his injury, 
approximately $35 more than the weekly wage his employer contended. Id. at 877-78. 
This difference would have amounted to nearly a $2000 deficiency at the end of one 
year. 
116. Holston contended that his injury resulted in a permanent twenty-five per­
cent (partial) loss of use of his leg; the AU determined that a twenty percent loss was 
reasonable and computed Holston'S compensation on that basis. Id. 
117. Id. at 878. 
118. Id. at 878, 881. 
119. See id. at 878. 
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reject and that the absence of this element precluded recovery.120 
Citing the purpose of the statute, the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument and upheld the assessment of attorney's fees under 
§ 928(b), stating, "[w]e do not believe that the statute contemplates 
the making of a written recommendation by the deputy commis­
sioner as a precondition ... [of] liability for attorney's fees. "121 The 
court went on to say that it "would not set aside" the attorney's fee 
award even if it "were ... to view the language requiring a written 
recommendation as a precondition to liability for fees,"122 since the 
recommendation that did follow the informal conference was refer­
ral to the ALl, and that the course of proceedings allowed the court 
to infer that "any explicit recommendation would have been re­
jected by one of the parties."123 In other words, the course of pro­
ceedings dictated by § 928(b) still did or would have substantively 
occurred so as to have advanced the matter to formal 
proceedings.124 
In reaching its decision, the National Steel court relied on the 
purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature enacting it, 
which was the assessment of attorney's fees in connection with a 
dispute over compensation resolved in favor of the employee 
through formal proceedings.125 Two subsequent Ninth Circuit cases 
served to clarify the rule of law first expressed in National Steel. 126 
120. Id. at 881. 
121. Id. at 882 ("The purpose of the statute is to authorize the assessment of legal 
fees against employers in cases where the existence or extent of liability is controverted 
and the employee-claimant succeeds in establishing liability or obtaining increased com­
pensation in formal proceedings in which he or she is represented by counsel." (empha­
sis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-1441 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 
4717)). Although the court cited the House Report to the 1972 LHWCA amendments, 
the court actually misrepresented the substance of the Report. See H.R. REP. No. 92­
1441; see also Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 629 (6th Cir. 
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007). 
122. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 606 F.2d at 882. 
123. Id. The court also commented on the employer's failure to bring the omitted 
written recommendation to the attention of the AU until it was no longer possible to 
cure this defect. Id. Under those facts, the court indicated that it would not have over­
turned the lower court's award of attorney's fees, even if it did view the written recom­
mendation as a precondition to recovery. Id. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. ("The congressional intent was to limit liability to cases in which the par­
ties disputed the existence or extent of liability, whether or not the employer had actually 
rejected an administrative recommendation." (emphasis added)). 
126. See Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998); Todd Shipyards Corp. 
v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991). 
856 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:833 
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Pro­
grams 127 involved a compensation dispute that was submitted to, 
and resolved at, the informal conference held before the deputy 
commissioner.128 At that conference, the employer acknowledged 
that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result 
of his injury and prepared a stipulation that admitted the claimant's 
right to compensation benefits associated therewith.129 The parties 
did not agree, however, on the employer's liability for claimant's 
attorney's fees, and that issue was eventually resolved in formal 
proceedings before the BRB, which assessed $5000 of the claim­
ant's attorney's fees to the employer pursuant to § 928(b).130 On 
appeal however, the Ninth Circuit overturned the award since 
there was no controversy concerning liability on the amount of 
compensation to be paid after the informal conference. [Those] 
issues were resolved by [the employer's] concession and the par­
ties' stipulation. Section 928(b) does not authorize the payment 
of attorneys' fees if the only unresolved issue is whether attor­
neys' fees awarded should be for services performed prior to the 
successful termination of the informal conference.131 
Citing its earlier holding in National Steel, the Ninth Circuit de­
clined to extend attorney's fees awards to circumstances in which 
there was no dispute over liability to be resolved in formal 
proceedings.132 
The Ninth Circuit again addressed the nature of the dispute 
and an associated assessment of attorney's fees in Matulic v. Office 
ofWorkers' Compensation Programs .133 Matulic, the claimant, was 
injured in September 1989, and his employer voluntarily paid tem­
porary total disability benefits from the time of injury until his re­
turn to work in December.134 After his return to work, Matulic 
applied for permanent partial disability benefits, and a dispute 
arose between employer and employee as to the extent of the in­
jury.135 The parties presented the dispute to the OWCP for resolu­
tion, and the OWCP issued a written recommendation as to the 
127. Todd Shipyards Corp., 950 F.2d 607. 
128. Id. at 609. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 61l. 
132. Id. at 610-11. 
133. Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998). 
134. Id. at 1055. 
135. Id. 
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extent of disability, as well as the weekly wage for use in benefit 
compensation calculations.136 The written recommendation, how­
ever, was issued without an informal conference being held despite 
the repeated requests from both employer and employee.137 When 
the parties were unable to settle the matter, and the OWCP also 
failed to issue a final Compensation Order, the parties turned to an 
AU for resolution.138 
The ALI determined that Matulic suffered a five percent per­
manent disability as a result of his injury, set the weekly wage 
amount upon which his compensation would be based, and denied 
Matulic an award of attorney's feesp9 Apparently dissatisfied with 
this result, the claimant filed an appeal with the BRB contesting the 
method of weekly wage calculation and the denial of attorney's 
fees, but the BRB affirmed.140 Matulic petitioned for appellate re­
view, and the case came before the Ninth Circuit.141 
As to the weekly wage computation, the court found that Ma­
tulic was entitled to greater compensation than that which the em­
ployer was willing to pay.142 As to the attorney's fees, the court 
contrasted Matulic's case with that of the employee in Todd Ship­
yards and reversed the denial of attorney's fees.143 Finding that the 
amount of compensation did remain in dispute after an attempt at 
informal resolution,l44 and that the claimant, through his attorney, 
was subsequently successful in obtaining a greater award in formal 
proceedings, the court held that Matulic was entitled to attorney's 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. Although the Ninth Circuit's decision does not disclose the details of the 
OWCP's written recommendation issued in the absence of an informal conference, the 
fact that the parties continued to disagree indicates that the recommendation was re­
jected by either the employer or employee, thus requiring the issue to be resolved via 
formal proceedings. See id. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. The BRB did not assess the AU determinations, but rather failed to 
take any action on the appeal for one year--conduct which had the effect of automati­
cally affirming the AU's finding. [d. 
141. [d. 
142. [d. at 1056-57. The wage dispute centered around which of three calculation 
methods was appropriate. [d. at 1055-56. Matulic, who ultimately prevailed, main­
tained that he was entitled to a calculation method that yielded a weekly amount 
greater than his employer was willing to pay. [d. at 1056-67. 
143. [d. at 1060. 
144. The court glossed over the lack of an informal conference on this point, and 
instead considered the written recommendation "the functional equivalent of an infor­
mal conference" for the purposes of assessing the dispute resolution process. [d. 
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fees on that basis.145 The fact that the employer did not formally 
reject the original recommendation by the OWCP made no differ­
ence to the court, since the dispute clearly continued despite that 
recommendation.146 In other words, the court, relying on the pur­
pose of the statute as originally stated in National Steel, focused on 
the course of dispute resolution and the fact that the claimant pre­
vailed in formal proceedings.147 
Overall, National Steel, Todd Shipyards, and Matulic all 
demonstrate the Ninth Circuit's focus on the course of proceedings 
and its disregard of the provisions of § 928(b) as "precondition [ s] to 
the imposition of liability for attorney's fees. "148 The Courts of Ap­
peal for the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, however, take a decidedly 
different approach. 
2. 	 The Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Fourth Circuits: 
Pool Co. v. Cooper and Virginia International 
Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards 
Although the Fifth Circuit issued a number of opinions relating 
to the application of § 928(b) following the 1972 LHWCA Amend­
ments,149 the 2001 decision in Pool Co. v. Cooper is probably its 
clearest and most strongly worded opinion on the issue of attor­
ney's fees. In Cooper, the claimant sustained a knee injury requir­
ing surgery in 1989.150 His employer voluntarily paid temporary 
145. [d. at 106l. 
146. [d. at 1060. Part of the employer's argument that it was not liable for claim­
ant's attorney's fees was its agreement to be bound by the recommendation of the 
OWCP. Id. Given that the dispute was not resolved at that point, it is fair to assume 
that the recommendation was favorable to the employer and that it "accepted" the 
recommendation so as not to be liable for attorney's fees. Cf 33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (2000) 
("If the employer or carrier refuse to accept such written recommendation, within four­
teen days after its receipt by them, they shall payor tender to the employee in writing 
the additional compensation, if any, to which they believe the employee is entitled."). 
Even if the employer "accepted" the compensation recommendation, however, 
§ 928(b) also provides a mechanism by which the employee may reject the employer's 
tender of compensation and potentially still recover attorney's fees in connection with 
formal proceedings to settle the issue. Id.; see supra note 105. 
147. Matulic, 154 F.3d at 1060-6l. 
148. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1979); 
see also Matulic, 154 F.3d at 1060-61; Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607, 
610-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (focusing on the nature of the disputes before the court, rather 
than the presence or absence of the provisions of § 928(b), when determining the pro­
priety of attorney's fee awards). 
149. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000), modified on 
reh'g, 237 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000); FMC Corp. v. Perez, 128 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Savannah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1981). 
150. Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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total compensation benefits while he was recuperating and contin­
ued to pay permanent partial disability benefits after he resumed 
his position in 1990.151 Unfortunately, Cooper injured his knee a 
second time in 1992, requiring another surgery.152 Once again, the 
employer voluntarily paid temporary total disability benefits, and 
later, permanent partial disability benefits.I53 One year after the 
second surgery, Cooper's surgeon determined that the knee had im­
proved as much as could be expected, resulting in a twenty percent 
loss of use.154 Within two months of the surgeon's disability deter­
mination, Cooper's employer stopped making all disability pay­
ments. I55 Unable to return to his previous position as a deckhand, 
Cooper sought alternate employment as a security guard, but con­
tinued to experience pain in his knee.156 
In February 1995, Cooper filed a claim for additional benefits 
with the OWCP.157 His previous employer disputed his right to any 
additional benefits and filed the appropriate forms with the 
OWCP.158 Although advised by the OWCP of Pool Company's po­
sition, Cooper never replied.159 By 1997, and after yet another sur­
gery, Cooper again sought additional benefits in connection with his 
knee injury, this time before an AU.160 The AU made a number 
of determinations as to the duration and nature of disability in the 
preceding years and consequently awarded benefits pursuant to 
those determinations.161 The judge, and later, the BRB, also 
awarded Cooper his attorney's fees. 162 
Once the case was before the Fifth Circuit, the issue of attor­
ney's fees under § 928(b) was disposed of quickly. While the Ninth 
Circuit evaluated the course of proceedings in connection with a 
dispute over compensation, the Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed 
this evaluation in favor of a straightforward, if not rigid, assessment: 
It is clear that the BRB erred in awarding attorney's fees under 











161. Id. at 176-77. 
162. Id. at 177. 
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troversy about the amount of additional compensation did subse­
quently arise; and Cooper subsequently did obtain a 
compensation award in excess of what Pool was willing to pay. 
However, as the parties concur, no informal conference with the 
Department of Labor ever took place. Under the law of our Cir­
cuit, that fact poses an absolute bar to an award of attorney's fees 
under § [9]28(bP63 
The Cooper decision served to solidify and clarify that which earlier 
Fifth Circuit cases had already established-§ 928(b) is to be con­
strued strictly and its provisions are to be considered preconditions 
to recovery of attorney's fees. 164 
In 2005, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's ap­
proach to § 928(b) in Virginia International Terminals, Inc. v. Ed­
wards.165 In that case, the claimant, Edwards, was injured on 
February 22, 2002 and filed a claim for disability benefits on Febru­
ary 28, 2002.166 His employer promptly paid temporary total bene­
fits for the period from February 26, March 31, when a doctor 
determined that Edwards could return to work.167 In July, how­
ever, Edwards, through counsel, requested benefits for the three 
days between the date of injury and the commencement of disabil­
ity payments, and further requested an informal conference in con­
nection with same.168 The OWCP communicated the request to 
Edwards's employer, which responded with a request for medical 
records to support the claim for benefits during those three days.169 
Edwards refused to supply the documentation and instead asked 
that the matter be formally resolved before an AU.170 Instead of 
163. Id. at 186 (emphasis added). The court did, however, award attorney's fees 
under § 928(a). Id. 
164. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404, 408-09 (5th Cir. 2000), modified 
on reh'g, 237 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000). In Staftex Staffing, the court denied an attorney's 
fee award since the disputed issue was never submitted to an informal conference, and a 
written recommendation was never issued. Id. However, upon rehearing, the award of 
attorney's fees was reinstated. Id.; see also FMC Corp. v. Perez, 128 F.3d 908, 910 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (denying an award of attorney's fees, noting its propriety under § 928(b) 
"only if the dispute has been the subject of an informal conference with the Department 
of Labor"); Savannah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 
1981) ("[I]f the other requirements of section [9]28(b) are met, an employee who ac­
cepts partial compensation, but who claims additional compensation, may receive attor­
ney's fees." (emphasis added»; infra Part V. 
165. Va. In!'1 Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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pursuing formal proceedings, the employer chose instead simply to 
pay disability benefits for the three days and close the matter. l7l 
Edwards then petitioned the court for attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with the disputed three days.l72 Although the AU re­
jected the claim based on the provisions of § 928(b), the BRB 
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(a).173 The employer ap­
pealed to the Court of Appeals for relief, arguing that neither sub­
section justified the award.174 
After meticulously analyzing the language of both subsections 
and how they relate to one another,175 the court agreed with the 
employer that neither subsection allowed for an award of attorney's 
fees in this caseP6 As to § 928(b), the court referred to the provi­
sions of the section as "mandatory statutory conditions,"177 and 
held that "[t]he failure to hold an informal conference or issue a 
written recommendation is fatal to a claim for attorney's fees under 
the plain terms of section 928(b). "178 
Like the Fifth Circuit in Cooper, the Fourth Circuit adopted a 
bright-line rule as to the propriety of attorney's fee awards under 
§ 928(b)-if all of the provisions of the subsection have not been 
met, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate.179 With the 
Ninth Circuit firmly rooted in its "course of dispute resolution" ap­
proach to the imposition of attorney's fees under § 928(b), and the 
Fifth and Fourth Circuits just as firmly rooted in their bright-line 
"provisions as preconditions to recovery" approach, which ap­





175. [d. at 316-17. The court relied heavily on the notion that adjacent sections of 
the same statute must be read together and that in order to give both sections distinct 
meaning, subsection (b) must be read strictly. See id. 
176. [d. at 316. 
177. [d. at 318. 
178. [d. The court repeated this sentiment later on in the opinion: "Plainly, under 
section 928(b), a fee award is not available absent an informal conference and written 
recommendation. None occurred here, and so Edwards was not entitled to a fee award 
under this subsection." [d. at 318-19. 
179. [d. at 319; see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP 
(Moody), 474 F.3d 109, 114 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Because [claimant] satisfies all of the 
requirements of § 928(b), he is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees he incurred 
...."); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP (Hassell), 477 F.3d 123, 
126 (4th Cir. 2007) ("The threshold requirements of § 928(b) are satisfied ...."). 
i 
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B. 	 The Sixth Circuit Weighs In: Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock 
Co. v. OWCP 
1. 	 Background 
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its 
first opinion on circumstances warranting attorney's fees under 
§ 928(b).180 Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock CO. V. OWCPl8l involved 
an injury that rendered the claimant permanently and totally dis­
abled, and unable to return to work.182 Before the disability deter­
mination through formal proceedings before an ALl, the claimant, 
Bordeaux, underwent years of medical and psychological treatment 
as well as physical and cognitive therapies in an attempt to improve 
the cognitive functions damaged by the injury.183 Although Bor­
deaux exhibited some improvement, his recovery arguably 
plateaued by the time the issue of disability was determined at the 
formal hearing.184 The "plateau" formed the central issue in the 
dispute: the employer contended that Bordeaux's cognitive injuries 
had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and thus were 
not "permanent."185 Since Bordeaux's doctors had noted that there 
was a possibility that additional psychotherapy and antidepressant 
medications might improve Bordeaux's cognitive functions,186 the 
employer refused to pay permanent total disability benefits.187 
180. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007). The amended decision reflects only a 
technical change in the decision, remanding the matter for additional proceedings to set 
the amount of attorney fees charged to the claimant pursuant to § 928(c) of the statute. 
See Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 473 F.3d at 267. Section 928(c) requires that the 
claimant's attorney's fees, when assessed to the claimant, must be approved and fixed 
by the deputy commissioner, BRB, or court. See 33 U.S.c. § 928(c) (2000). 
181. For the facts of Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., see supra notes 1-17 and 
accompanying text. 
182. 	 Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 619-20. 
183. Id. Bordeaux attended speech therapy to help with his memory and atten­
tion span, took a variety of antidepressants to treat anxiety and depression (each of 
which produced intolerable side effects and ultimately had to be stopped), and was 
examined and treated by a psychologist, a neuropsychologist, and a neurologist, all in 
an attempt to find a course or courses of treatment that would improve his disability. 
Id. 
184. Id. Bordeaux's psychologist and neuropsychologist both testified at the for­
mal hearing that his cognitive injuries had reached "maximum medical improvement." 
His neurologist testified that additional psychotherapy, as urged by the employer, 
would not treat his cognitive problems, nor improve the degree of cognitive disability. 
Id. 
185. 	 Id. at 621. 
186. 	 Id. 
187. Id. at 622. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the employer even went so far 
as to file a motion to compel Bordeaux to undergo additional psychotherapy (which 
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Bordeaux and his employer had initially attempted to settle the 
matter informally188 via the LHWCA's dispute resolution pro­
cess.189 Following the informal conference held on September 19, 
2002, the claims review officer from the OWCP issued a written 
recommendation, but, curiously, one that stated he was not making 
a recommendation since the parties were attempting to settle.190 In 
any event, settlement never occurred and the matter was formally 
determined by the AU decision issued in January of 2004, which 
awarded medical benefits, temporary total disability compensation 
from the date of injury until August 20, 2002, and permanent total 
disability compensation from that point on.191 The ALJ also as­
sessed attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(a) of the LHWCA. The 
employer appealed this decision to the BRB, but the BRB upheld 
the ALI's award, including that for attorney's fees-but this time 
pursuant to § 928(b).192 When the employer again appealed the de­
cision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the pre­
vious decisions, except with regard to the award of attorney's 
fees. 193 
2. Majority Opinion 
Noting the existing circuit split regarding the interpretation 
and application of § 928(b),194 the Sixth Circuit first examined the 
included resuming the antidepressants that his body was unable to tolerate) or have his 
compensation benefits suspended. Id. at 623. 
188. The employer contended that three informal conferences were held in con­
nection with the extent and permanence of Bordeaux's injuries, but the court only 
found evidence of one in the record. Id. at 625 n.3. 
189. See 33 U.S.c. §§ 914(d), 914(h), 919 (2000). 
190. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625. The respondent Bor­
deaux's appellate brief alleges that the claims review officer actually recommended a 
settlement figure of $200,000. See Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux, supra 
note 1, at 31. However, the petitioner-employer's brief states that the claims review 
officer made no recommendation in writing as to the disposition of the "permanence of 
disability" dispute. Final Brief of Petitioners at 33-34, Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. 
v. OWCP, (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-3425). 
191. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. August 20, 2002, was the 
date that the AU determined that Bordeaux became permanently totally disabled, pre­
sumably based on testimony from one of the doctors, who determined that August 20, 
2002 to be the date on which Bordeaux's injuries had reached "maximum medical im­
provement." Id. 
192. [d. See supra note 105 and accompanying text to compare the language of 
subsections (a) and (b), and the circumstances under which each subsection should be 
applied. 
193. [d. at 629. 
194. Id. at 627. 
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holdings of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.195 Finding merit 
in reliance on the plain language of § 928(b) by the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits, the Sixth Circuit adopted the bright line, "provisions as 
preconditions to recovery" approach.196 After determining that the 
plain language of the section is clear and unambiguous,197 the ma­
jority attacked the Ninth Circuit's reliance on statutory purpose and 
legislative history first expressed in National Steel as inappropriate 
considering the plain language of the statute.198 Finding "no writ­
ten recommendation regarding the disposition of the controversy," 
the court reversed the BRB's award of attorney's fees under 
§ 928(b); and finding § 928(a) inapplicable as well,199 the court de­
clined an award of attorney's fees altogether.20o 
3. The Dissenting Opinion 
Despite the relative ease with which the majority was able to 
reach its decision on the matter of attorney's fees, one judge wrote 
a dissent to express her disagreement with both the reasoning and 
the result: 
Denying fees to Bordeaux based on rigid formalities that are not 
expressly mandated by the statute is contrary to two of the pri­
mary concerns underlying the [LHWCA]: the availability of 
quick recovery for valid workplace-injury claims without resort 
to the courts, and when this fails, claimants' full recovery of stat­
utory benefits without reduction by the cost of legal services.201 
Judge Moore wrote that she would have awarded Bordeaux's attor­
ney's fees under either § 928(a) or (b).202 
With regard to § 928(b) specifically, Judge Moore took issue 
with the majority's characterization of the plain language of the 
subsection dictating preconditions to recovery when the statute 
195. Id. at 627-29. 
196. Id. at 628. 
197. Id. ("The language of subsection (b) plainly states that in order for fees to be 
assessed under its terms there must be a written recommendation containing a sug­
gested disposition of the controversy."). 
198. Id. at 629. Notwithstanding the improper use of legislative history when the 
language is clear, the majority also went on to note that the court in National Steel 
actually misstated the legislative history on which it relied, and for that reason as well, 
found the Ninth Circuit's approach faulty and without merit. Id.; see supra notes 108­
125 and accompanying text. 
199. Id. at 626-27. 
200. Id. at 629. 
201. Id. at 629-30 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
202. Id. at 635. 
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does not identify them as such.203 She noted that the subsection is 
silent as to a situation like Bordeaux's, in which the provisions out­
lined in the subsection have not been met "through no fault of the 
claimant, but rather as a result of the agency's failure to follow its 
duties."204 Clearly distressed by the effect of the majority's decision 
on people situated similarly to Bordeaux, Judge Moore emphasized 
the failure of the agency to discharge its statutory duties205 and the 
absence of fault (and control) the claimant had over his ability to 
cure the dispute procedure's shortcomings.206 Reasoning that de­
nying attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(b) in these circumstances 
"would be at odds with the policies underlying the [LHWCA]," 
Judge Moore concluded that Bordeaux should have recovered his 
attorney's fees pursuant to that subsection.207 
With nearly thirty years of reasoning employed by four sepa­
rate courts of appeal and the circuit split still intact, the question 
remains: what is the proper interpretation and application of the 
provisions of § 928(b) of the LHWCA? By undertaking inquiries 
into (1) the plain meaning of the subsection; (2) the legislative in­
tent embodied in both the language of the Act as a whole and as 
represented in judicial decisions since the Act's enactment; and (3) 
the genesis of workers' compensation law, this Note attempts to an­
swer that precise question in Part IV. 
IV. EQUITY AND HISTORY DEMAND SUBSTANCE OVER FORM 
The LHWCA provides a compensation mechanism for on-the­
job injuries sustained by maritime workers.20s The purpose under­
lying the statute is to provide prompt and adequate compensation 
203. Id. at 634. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
[T]he claims officer failed to follow his statutory obligation of making a rec­
ommendation disposing of the controversy and instead directly contravened 
the statute by stating that he was making "no recommendation." ... The em­
ployer should not secure a windfall because the claims officer shirked his stat­
utory duty, particularly when nothing in the statute mandates that we enforce 
such preconditions to recovery. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
206. Id. ("Bordeaux requested and participated in the informal conference .... It 
is no fault of Bordeaux that the claims review officer did not make a recommendation 
on the disputed issue."); see also id. at 634 n.7 ("[T]he lack of a written recommenda­
tion was in no way a result of any deficiency on the part of Bordeaux.") 
207. Id. at 635. 
208. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 
(2000). 
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for valid workplace injury claims.209 When injured workers have 
not successfully obtained adequate compensation for their injuries 
through the statutory claims process, and subsequently must resort 
to the courts to secure those benefits, the LHWCA also provides a 
mechanism in two limited circumstances for the successful claimant 
to shift his or her legal fees to the employer. Subsection (a) of 
§ 928 addresses the circumstance when the employer disputes liabil­
ity and refuses to pay any compensation,210 while subsection (b) ad­
dresses the circumstance in which the employer paid some 
compensation, but a dispute later arises as to the amount of com­
pensation due.211 Aside from these circumstances, the statute ex­
pressly prohibits fee-shifting in any other situation.212 
The courts are particularly divided over appropriate attorney's 
fee awards under subsection (b), which delineates procedural ante­
cedents for recovery of attorney's fees.213 The controversy is one of 
statutory interpretation: are the provisions of subsection (b) rigid 
prerequisites to fee awards? The Fourth, Fifth, and most recently, 
the Sixth Circuits have ruled in favor of strict statutory interpreta­
tion, citing the plain language of subsection (b) and holding that the 
absence of precise compliance with its provisions precludes recov­
ery of the claimant's attorney's fees.214 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
has favored a broad statutory interpretation, and, citing the stat­
ute's purpose, has held that provisions of subsection (b) are not to 
be read as inflexible preconditions to a claimant's award of attor­
ney's fees.215 
209. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 630 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
210. 33 U.S.c. § 928(a). 
211. Id. § 928(b). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. See Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 629 (reversing an award of 
attorney's fees, citing the absence of a written recommendation); Va. Int'I Terminals v. 
Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming the BRB's denial of attorney's 
fees under subsection (b), citing the absence of both an informal conference and written 
recommendation); Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing an 
award of attorney's fees under subsection (b), citing the absence of an informal confer­
ence); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP, 474 F.3d 109, 
113 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming an award of attorney's fees, citing the occurrence of an 
informal conference on the disputed matter, a written recommendation, the employer's 
rejection of the recommendation, and the claimant's subsequent use of an attorney to 
secure compensation benefits in excess of those the employer originally tendered). 
215. See Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 
1979) (affirming an award of attorney's fees under subsection (b) in the absence of a 
written recommendation, citing the general statutory purpose "to authorize the assess­
ment of legal fees against employers in cases where the existence or extent of liability is 
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Which interpretation is correct? Based on the language of the 
statute, the historical context that gave rise to workers' compensa­
tion law, and the judiciary's well-established policy of liberal inter­
pretation and broad application of the LHWCA, the Ninth Circuit's 
approach, which embraces the liberal policies of eighty years of pre­
cedent, is the proper analytical framework. 
A. The Statute's "Plain Meaning" Is Not Plain 
The first place to start in questions of statutory interpretation 
is the language itself.216 When the meaning of statutory language is 
clear, the courts must enforce the statute according to its terms.217 
What, then, is the plain meaning of § 928(b)? 
The courts often utilize canons of construction as interpretive 
aids when they are asked to assign meaning to statutory language. 
Many basic canons of construction concern how language is used 
and how to discern meaning from the language employed.218 For 
example, an initial inquiry might evaluate whether the terms uti­
lized in the subsection are used in their ordinary sense or are "terms 
of art" to which the legislature has assigned a special meaning.219 
Since the controversy around subsection (b) centers on whether the 
steps provided are strict prerequisites to attorney's fee awards, it is 
important to focus on the words associated with each of those steps. 
controverted and the employee-claimant succeeds in establishing liability or obtaining 
increased compensation in formal proceedings in which he or she is represented by 
counsel"); see also Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (in award­
ing attorney's fees, analysis focused on the statutory purpose stated in National Steel 
and did not assess the extent of adherence to the provisions outlined in subsection (b»; 
cf Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (in reversing 
award of attorney's fees, contrasted statutory purpose stated in National Steel and 
noted that there was no controversy following an informal conference, nor a subsequent 
formal proceeding to secure additional benefits). 
216. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980) ("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting 
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself."); see also Am. To­
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 
580 (1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 1995). 
217. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); see also YULE 
KIM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND RECENT TRENDS 4 (2008), www.fas.orglsgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. The so-called 
"plain meaning rule" states that when the meaning of the statutory language is clear, 
the judiciary need not undertake any further investigation to discern meaning; there is a 
presumption that the statute means what it says, and if that meaning is clear, that is the 
end of judicial analysis. [d. 
218. KIM, supra note 217, at summary. 
219. [d. at 5-6. 
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In this case, the operative word is "shall,"220 which is commonly 
understood to mean that the action is mandatory as opposed to 
discretionary.221 
What then, are the mandatory directives? The Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits have determined that the "plain meaning" of the 
statute mandates, at the very least, the occurrence of the informal 
conference and the issuance of the written recommendation, as 
these elements of § 928(b) have been amply litigated.222 This inter­
pretation, however, is inaccurate: careful evaluation of the language 
surrounding the all-important word "shall" in every instance pro­
duces a slightly different meaning. The statute's use of "shall" cre­
ates statutory obligations for the deputy commissioner or Board 
and the employer, rather than creating threshold events for attor­
ney's fee awards. The phrase "the deputy commissioner or Board 
shall set the matter for an informal conference" is quite different 
than "an informal conference shall be required."223 This is also true 
for the written recommendation: "the deputy commissioner or 
Board shall recommend in writing" does not imply "a written rec­
ommendation shall be required."224 In other words, rather than 
simply requiring that certain events occur and assigning that re­
sponsibility to everyone by specifying no one, the statute mandates 
the discharge of a duty by specifically assigning it to the deputy 
commissioner or Board. In the sense that Congress means what it 
says and chooses its language carefully, it is reasonable that the 
plain meaning of the statute creates a statutory duty that is charge­
able to the claims review officer and not a threshold event in the 
220. Relevant excerpts from 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) include "deputy commissioner or 
Board shall set the matter for an informal conference," "deputy commissioner or Board 
shall recommend in writing a disposition of the controversy," "employer or carrier ... 
shall pay [the recommended compensation] or tender to the employee [a written 
counter offer]," and "if the compensation thereafter awarded is greater than the 
amount paid ... reasonable attorney's feels] ... shall be awarded in addition to the 
amount of compensation." 33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (2000) (emphases added). 
221. KIM, supra note 217, at 9. 
222. See supra Parts III.A.2 and 1I1.B.2 for a discussion of those cases addressing 
informal conferences and written recommendations pursuant to § 928(b). 
223. The statute actually reads, in part 
If ... a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation ... 
to which the employee may be entitled, the deputy commissioner or Board 
shall set the matter for an informal conference and following such conference 
the deputy commissioner or Board shall recommend in writing a disposition of 
the controversy. 
33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (emphases added). 
224. See id. (emphases added). 
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dispute resolution process, as interpreted by the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits. 
If all parties involved-employer, employee, and claims review 
officer-participate in the dispute resolution process as Congress 
had envisioned, the distinction between threshold preconditions to 
recovery and the discharge of statutory duties is irrelevant because 
all steps are satisfied. The distinction becomes relevant when the 
steps are not followed precisely,22s thus illuminating the provision's 
latent ambiguity. What exactly is required under § 928(b): the oc­
currence of threshold events or the discharge of statutory duties? 
Since the courts have found merit in the "threshold event" in­
terpretation, and the "plain meaning" of subsection (b) is unclear in 
light of the possible "statutory duty" interpretation, the next step 
the court would undertake is to evaluate whether there are "equally 
plausible interpretations." If so, the court must take pains to 
choose a reading that would "avoid a patently unjust result."226 
Bordeaux's situation is a prime example for this sort of evaluation. 
Courts applying the strict "threshold event" interpretation would 
deny recovery of attorney's fees. This result however is unjust for 
Bordeaux, the injured worker, since his ability to recover the legal 
fees he incurred during the lengthy process to obtain additional 
compensation was completely barred as a consequence of a third 
party's failure to issue the written recommendation.227 No matter 
how precisely Bordeaux followed the prescribed claims process, this 
oversight, willful or merely negligent, cut into his compensation 
award by thousands of dollars. The failure of the deputy commis­
sioner resulted in prejudice to the claimant, as the dissenting judge 
zealously pointed OUt.228 
If the court instead read the statute liberally to require only 
that the commissioner issue a recommendation, the court might still 
award Bordeaux his attorney's fees, since failure to comply was not 
the fault of the claimant. Further, the substantive process still oc­
curred: a dispute arose as to the extent of the employer's liability 
225. See cases discussed supra Part III. 
226. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBlE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION § 45:12 (7th ed. 2007); see also United States v. Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("[W]hen the plain meaning ... pro­
duce[s] ... an unreasonable [result] 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation 
as a whole,' [we are to] follow[] that purpose, rather than the literal words." (footnote 
omitted)). 
227. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 629 (6th Cir. 
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007). 
228. [d. at 634 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
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for the claimant's injuries; the dispute was not resolved by the pre­
scribed administrative proceedings; and the claimant, with the assis­
tance of counsel, resorted to the courts to obtain a compensation 
award greater than that which the employer was initially willing to 
pay. To the extent that the two readings are equally plausible, the 
canon of construction favoring results that do not produce injustice 
clearly supports a liberal construction of § 928(b). 
It is true that the plain meaning of the statutory language is 
generally regarded as conclusive evidence of its intended applica­
tion and, in the absence of ambiguity, there is no need for further 
judicial analysis.229 The Supreme Court long ago recognized, how­
ever, that the plain-meaning rule "is rather an axiom of experience 
than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persua­
sive evidence if it exists."23o More than fifty years later, the Court 
reaffirmed this notion in Watt. v. Alaska, wherein it recognized that 
"[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may 
persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common 
meaning to have their literal effect."231 Bordeaux's situation 
presents precisely such a dilemma: even supposing that the lan­
guage of § 928(b) is sufficiently plain so as not to trigger additional 
assessment pursuant to a determination of ambiguity, could Con­
gress have ever intended the courts to adopt such a mindlessly lit­
eral reading in light of the circumstances under which the 
legislation was originally passed? 
B. 	 The History and Intent of the Statute Support a Broad 
Interpretation and Liberal Application 
In light of the potential ambiguity regarding the plain meaning, 
or alternatively, an inexplicably literal reading, of the language of 
§ 928(b), it is appropriate to consider a few other canons of con­
struction. When the precise meaning of statutory language is un­
clear, and as a consequence, the proper interpretation and 
application are unknowable, courts' analyses have long relied on 
the basic rule that "a statute should be read as a harmonious whole, 
with its various parts being interpreted within their broader statu­
tory context in a manner that furthers statutory purposes. "232 
229. For a discussion of the plain-meaning rule, see supra note 217 and accompa­
nying text. 
230. 	 Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
231. 	 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,266 (1981). 
232. KIM, supra note 217, at 2; see also Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 
158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, [the court] look[s] not only to 
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In this case, there is ample statutory context and statutory pur­
pose to consult. This Note reviewed the socioeconomic circum­
stances that gave rise to workers' compensation as a body of law.233 
Under the common law, workers often had exceedingly limited 
remedies for injuries, and could rely only on the discretionary gen­
erosity of their employers, families, or friends.234 Those that could 
resort to the courts experienced great delay in receiving compensa­
tion (if any compensation were received at all), significant cost, and 
wildly inconsistent results. Unsatisfied with this state of affairs, 
lawmakers revamped the system to humanize and standardize in­
jury compensation proceedings. Two main objectives were borne 
out of workers' unsatisfactory experience with the compensation 
"system" as it existed prior to the turn of the twentieth century: (1) 
to provide injured workers a prompt, uniform, and efficient com­
pensation process without having to resort to the courts;235 and (2) 
to assess the costs of injury to the industries that produced them.236 
In other words, workers' compensation arose as a remedial al­
ternative to the inadequate and inequitable remedies originally 
available at common law. Statutes that are remedial in nature 
ought to be liberally construed to effectuate that purpose.237 Over 
the last century, workers' compensation legislation has exhibited a 
general trend of enlarging the scope of coverage to an increasing 
number of activities, persons, and injuries.238 From this general 
trend, one could reasonably infer a congressional intent to broaden, 
rather than narrow, the application of workers' compensation legis­
lation. As a general matter, Congress has indicated a preference 
for broad and liberal application of the workers' compensation stat­
utory remedies, consistent with the general rule regarding remedial 
1egislation.239 Inasmuch as attorney's fee awards under the 
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its 
object and policy."); 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 226, § 46:5. 
233. See supra Part I. 
234. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 2. 
235. 1 SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 4-5. 
236. Id. at 2; see, e.g., Bundy v. Vt. State Highway Dep't, 146 A. 68, 69 (Vt. 1929) 
("The ultimate purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act ... is to treat the cost of 
personal injuries incidental to the employment as a part of the cost of the business." 
(citation omitted». 
237. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2000); Empire 
United Stevedores v. Gatlin, 936 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1991). 
238. LARSON, supra note 28, at 28. 
239. See, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) 
("[Broad] construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation."); Peyton v. Rowe, 
391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) (the court's interpretation of "the statute is consistent with the 
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LHWCA are remedial in nature, it follows that their application 
requires adherence to the general rule: broad interpretation and lib­
eral application. 
The same is true for the more specific workers' compensation 
provisions of the LHWCA. The LHWCA was passed in response 
to repeated failed attempts to apply state compensation remedies 
for injuries sustained by workers under maritime and admiralty 
law.240 The concern about leaving an injured worker without a 
practical remedy, or any remedy at all, provides some insight about 
the motivations behind the Act's enactment. The purpose of the 
LHWCA, as restated by the Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat 
court, is to relieve an injured worker of the financial burdens associ­
ated with his injury and, further, to assign the cost of injury to the 
industry that produced it.241 
In the years following enactment, the legislature and courts 
have taken steps to effectuate and broaden this basic purpose. The 
1972 LHWCA Amendments were passed to "provide adequate in­
come replacement," noting that "adequate workmen's compensa­
tion benefits are ... essential to meeting the needs of the injured 
employee and his family."242 This is evidence of Congress's intent 
to ensure adequate compensation. The 1972 Amendments also in­
creased scope of coverage landward, to cover those workers injured 
in the previously legal "grey area" between the shore and "naviga­
ble waters." This single addition produced widespread change for 
claims under the LHWCA, as it provided remedies for those work­
ers previously left without, which is further evidence of a congres­
sional objective to ensure that all those in need of coverage could 
avail themselves of the LHWCA's remedies, a sort of no-maritime­
worker-left-behind approach. 
The courts have similarly stressed the importance of liberal 
construction, beginning in 1932 with Baltimore & Philadelphia 
Steamboat. Even in cases where the precise requirements of the 
canon of construction that remedial statutes should be liberally construed"); Tcher­
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[W]e are guided by the familiar canon of 
statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectu­
ate its purposes."); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) ("The statute is a 
remedial one and should be construed liberally to carry out the wise and salutary pur­
poses of its enactment. "). 
240. For discussion of jurisdictional "hiccups" when maritime workers compensa­
tion was beginning to take shape, see Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 
(1917), and companion cases cited supra Part II. 
241. See BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932). 
242. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4699. 
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statute have not been carried out, the courts have looked to the 
substantive aspects of the process and the overall fairness of the 
result, taking care to avoid any unduly severe, unfair, or anomalous 
consequence to the worker.243 Only in the most isolated, well-de­
fined situations have the courts been unwilling to extend liberal 
construction to claimants.244 
Insofar as both the legislature and judiciary have expressed a 
clear preference for broad statutory interpretation and liberal con­
struction to effectuate. the purpose of adequate compensation for 
maritime workers, that construction ought to apply to the applica­
tion of attorney's fee awards under § 928(b). Strict compliance 
leads to fewer attorneys' fee awards, and fewer attorneys' fee 
awards will lead to a reduction of compensation benefits by the cost 
to secure them. 
Requiring strict compliance with the provisions of the statute 
not only contradicts the plain language of the Act and the over­
whelming history of liberal application of other provisions of the 
LHWCA, but also contradicts the considerations that created work­
ers' compensation law in the first place. Accordingly, the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits' "provisions as preconditions to recovery" 
approach is unfounded. 
C. 	 Congress Would Not Have Intended to Hold Others' Failures 
to Discharge Their Statutory Duties Against the Injured 
Worker 
Returning for a moment to the language of subsection (b), the 
plain-meaning assessment revealed certain statutory duties related 
to the disputed claim.245 As a result of the statutory obligations, 
this Note finally contends that when the claimant has undertaken 
good faith attempts to participate in the dispute resolution process, 
and either the reviewing authority or the employer (or both) has 
failed to discharge its statutory obligations under subsection (b), the 
court ought to construe the subsection liberally on grounds of eq­
243. See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 334 (1953); supra notes 99-102 and 
accompanying text. 
244. The courts have drawn the "liberal construction" line in two situations: 
those in which the claimant is pursuing a claim without merit-for example, Metropoli­
tan Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1993)-and those in which a liberal 
construction in favor of the claimant would require the court to pervert or alter the 
plain meaning of the language employed by Congress-for example, Pillsbury v. United 
Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952), and OWCP v. Robertson, 625 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
245. 	 See supra Part IV.A. 
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uity and of the LHWCA's purpose of adequate compensation undi­
minished by the cost to litigate the right to that compensation. 
Had the drafters anticipated the possibility that all parties may 
not participate in the administrative claims dispute resolution pro­
cess as required by statute, they likely would have pointed to the 
purpose of compensating valid workplace injuries.246 Accordingly, 
courts should consider the longstanding notion that the LHWCA 
should be liberally construed to avoid harsh and incongruous re­
sultS.247 Congress could not have viewed the statutory failures of 
others as posing a legitimate bar to a claimant's recovery of attor­
ney's fees. Allowing a party to evade his responsibility would en­
able the employer to avoid assessment of legal fees by simply-and 
without penalty-failing to discharge his statutory obligations.248 
Leaving the claimant to shoulder the financial burden of even the 
most legitimate claim is compLeteLy contrary to the very spirit of the 
Act. Accordingly, had the drafters anticipated this bad faith sce­
nario, they almost certainly would have closed this legislative loop­
hole. As the legislature did not contemplate this possibility, courts 
must construe § 92S(b) liberally so as to avoid the harsh and incon­
gruous consequences of strict construction. 
This approach best achieves the goal of adequate and prompt 
compensation for valid workplace injuries without resort to the 
courts. Legislatures and courts are concerned with fairness and eq­
uity. In fact, the inclusion of a fee-shifting provision in the 
LHWCA may have been another congressional mechanism to ef­
fectuate its general purpose. If employers are on notice that they 
may bear the cost of a successful claimant's attorney's fees (should 
the matter end up in court), they may be encouraged to negotiate a 
compensation benefit in good faith, promptly, fairly, and efficiently. 
Ultimately, these are the key concerns of an injured worker and the 
concerns that motivated workers' compensation statutes in the first 
246. Congress apparently presumed that the reviewing authority and employer 
would discharge their duties as directed, and did not contemplate the consequence if 
they failed to do so, as there is no provision addressing such a situation. "[W]here the 
drafters of a statute did not contemplate a specific situation, that statute should be 
construed in conformity with the probable intent of the draftsmen as if they had antici­
pated the situation as it had been presented to the court." 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra 
note 226, § 45:12. 
247. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
248. Failure to tender the additional compensation that the employee believes is 
due (a "precondition" in jurisdictions employing strict statutory construction of 
§ 928(b» could potentially bar recovery for even the most legitimate claim. 
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place. A liberal reading of subsection (b) achieves all of these 
goals. 
D. 	 Embedded in the Statute Is an Additional Workable 
Approach 
Despite the overwhelming trend to liberally construe other 
provisions of the LHWCA, the majority of circuits that have inter­
preted the fee-shifting provision have done so strictly, citing the 
plain language and treating the steps outlined as threshold events 
for fee recovery. The Ninth Circuit's rule of liberal construction 
makes it seem a renegade circuit on this issue. A closer look at the 
decisions denying attorney's fees awards, however, suggests that the 
courts might be doing something more substantive than merely ap­
plying an overly strict construction. 
In Virginia International Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, for exam­
ple, the employer voluntarily paid benefits for the employee's in­
jury in the absence of any award.249 The three-day compensation 
gap was initially disputed, but ultimately settled when the employer 
chose to pay the disputed amount rather than subject itself to litiga­
tion.250 Although the Fourth Circuit based its opinion on the lack of 
the informal conference and associated written recommendation,251 
the court's holding suggests a commitment to the broader purpose 
of the statute of creating a process for employers and employees to 
settle their disputes. 
In substance, the employer did exactly what it was supposed to 
do. Virginia International was willing to participate in the review 
process regarding the disputed three days and, having decided to 
avoid litigation and its associated costs and delay, simply paid the 
additional benefits. The employer left the table with knowledge 
that the matter had been efficiently attended to, and the employee 
obtained prompt compensation. If the court were then also to as­
sess attorney's fees, it would in essence be penalizing the very be­
havior the statute sought to encourage. What motivation is there to 
negotiate in good faith if the court could still assess attorney's fees 
despite the employer's most virtuous treatment of a worker's 
claim? 
The holding in Pool Co. v. Cooper provides another illustration 
of this point. In that case, the injured worker properly initiated a 
249. 	 See Va. Int'I Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). 
250. 	 [d. 
251. 	 [d. at 316-17. 
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claim for benefits but failed to respond to the preliminary corre­
spondence from the OWCP and the employer, which would have 
enabled the matter to proceed to the informal conference stage.252 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the attorney's fee award, again based on 
the lack of an informal conference and written recommendation.253 
Yet, as in Edwards, the court may have been making a common­
sense judgment based on fairness to the employer, who was willing 
to negotiate the claim according to the terms prescribed in the stat­
ute. Here, it was the claimant who failed to participate in the pro­
cess. It seems fundamentally unfair to reward the claimant's failure 
to follow through from the "purse" of the party that remained will­
ing to engage in the review process in good faith. 
A more workable rule, then, is one that considers the provi­
sions of subsection (b) but does not view them as rigid precondi­
tions to attorney's fee awards. The liberal construction 
overwhelmingly preferred can still be facilitated by looking at the 
conduct of the parties in the midst of the claims process: actions 
that suggest bad faith or lack of fair play on the part of the em­
ployer ought to increase the court's likelihood of assessing attor­
ney's fees. In cases where the claimant has "dropped the ball" 
while the employer remained a willing participant in the process, 
the courts might curtail the liberal construction so as to effectuate 
both the purposes of the statute as well as overall fairness to all 
parties involved. In cases where the employer or claims review of­
ficer impedes informal dispute resolution, the courts ought to award 
attorney's fees to a successful claimant as often as the statute per­
mits. The employer and claims officer should not have any incen­
tive to engage in conduct that has the potential to further injure a 
claimant. To interpret the fee-shifting provision of the LHWCA in 
any other manner will only perpetuate injustice for those in circum­
stances like Bordeaux. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Revolution produced lllJunes and socioeco­
nomic hardship that prompted the state and federal governments to 
reevaluate treatment of the labor force. The modern workers' com­
pensation theory that has evolved operates to protect and compen­
sate injured workers adequately, promptly, and without regard to 
fault. Both state and federal legislatures have had ample practice in 
252. Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 176, 186 (5th Cir. 2001). 
253. Id. at 186. 
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drafting statutes to carry out these goals, and the language Con­
gress has chosen is owed significant deference. The Courts of Ap­
peal for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have perverted the 
meaning of § 928(b) of the LHWCA, inferring strict requirements 
where Congress did not intend such rigidity. The result is a contra­
diction of the liberal compensation goals established through many 
years of legislative development and judicial application, undermin­
ing the very purpose of workers' compensation law. For workers 
like Bordeaux, those decisions can effectively victimize the em­
ployee twice-first, at the time of injury, and second, when the cost 
to fight for the right to compensation effectively reduces any award 
obtained. 
A more appropriate approach to this problem is to evaluate 
the course of dispute resolution proceedings between the parties. It 
is critical that the courts are mindful of the context in which the 
injury and subsequent dispute arose, as well as the objectives of the 
LHWCA. Bordeaux did everything in his power to follow proce­
dure and participate in the dispute resolution process. Had the in­
jury occurred in the Ninth Circuit, the court no doubt would have 
recognized that Bordeaux's situation was exactly the sort that Con­
gress had in mind when it provided for attorney's fee awards. In­
stead, the Sixth Circuit's decision effectively negated the very 
workers' compensation goals Bordeaux expected would protect 
him-his injuries were permanent, his compensation delayed, and, 
in view of the decision in Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., resort 
to the court made his compensation inadequate. For Bordeaux, the 
injustice is unconscionable. 
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